Ranking of journals or other objects according
Rank ordering of mean ratings, a common practice in library science research, can lead to serious Type 1 errors if the mean ratings are not first submitted to tests of significance. "Type 1" errors are those in which a hypothesis assuming no difference between two means, say, is actually true but is treated as untrue by the researcher. In turn, Type 1 errors, if not recognized, may lead to unjustified social or administrative actions or other errors of judgment or policy.
Two examples will illustrate. The first is from my own research some years ago, which inconclusively attempts to correlate mean ratings of subject-area characteristics (computed from a 10-point scale) with variables of library circulation. 1 The absence of strong correlations may be attributed to the probable absence of significant differences between the mean ratings of subject areas. Had those differences been tested, the limitations of my design might have been realized. Fortunately the longterm consequences were as negligible as the correlation, as I had merely failed to build good theory.
The second example appears in an article by Kohl and Davis. 2 These authors asked ARL library directors and deans of accredited library schools to rate thirtyone library journals in terms of their importance to evaluations of publications by librarians or faculty being considered for promotion and tenure. Each journal title was rated by each respondent on a 5-point Likert scale. The authors computed the mean rating of each journal, then ranked the journals according to these means. As in my own research, the authors did not test to determine whether means were significantly different from each otheralthough they did compare directors' ratings to deans' ratings. Without such a test there is no evidence that one mean rating is any different from any other.
The rankings in question appear in their The small visual differences between the means in table 1 and the small sample size from which the journal means were computed also cast suspicion on conclusions drawn from them. The Scheffe test is appropriate for all possible comparisons. 4 The data reported in their tables 1 (mean ratings) and 2 (sample sizes and standard deviations) make it possible to compute an overall mean square within (MSw), which is required to compute an F statistic, which, in tum, is required to perform the test. The equation for F is
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Working backwards, it is pos~ible to compute MSw from the statistics reported in table 3, as follows: Nearly identical results were obtained when a t-test for independent samples (though these samples may not be truly independent) was performed, again working backward from the standard deviations to obtain sums of squares and standard errors of the differences between each pair of means.
Finally, confidence intervals for all means in the ARL directors' list were computed, again at the .05 significance level. For every journal, the confidence interval overlapped the one above it and below it. For example, the lower and upper limits for C&RL were 4.60 and4.87, respectively, while the lower and upper limits for LQ were 4.09 and 4.72. Clearly, the upper limit of LQ falls well within the interval for C&RL, indicating that their means cannot be distinguished from each other.
Visual inspection of the means for library school deans' rankings (right column of table 1) suggests that few significant differences would be found between adjacent journals in that list either.
This analysis suggests that ranking average ratings without submitting them to appropriate tests of significance cannot be trusted. Such tests are necessary even when data are trustworthy-for example, when the sample is large, or when it otherwise represents the population with a high degree of confidence. Here, a distinction should be made between performing tests of significance to guard against sampling errors on the one hand and measurement errors on the other. Here, the rating scores can properly be considered as measurements subject to error. For example, an average score can hide a great diversity of opinion. If we ask 100 respondents to rate journals on a 1-to-5 scale, a particular journal could receive an average of 3.0 in several ways. At the extremes, all respondents could give the journal a rating of 3; or 50 respondents could give a rating of 1; and 50, a rating of 5. Both scenarios produce an average of 3.0, but the first represents exact consensus. In the second, the average score hides a considerable degree of measurement error. In fact, in the second scenario no individual respondent gives the journal a rating of 3.0 and we might well question whether a real consensus exists that a journal with a rating of 3.0 is really higher than one with a rating of2.9.
Kohl and Davis sprinkle cautions throughout their study, noting that it has "important limitations" that must be considered "to maintain a proper perspective on the findings." Perhaps the major caution should address the use of these or similar ranks for determining tenure and promotion.
If journal prestige and importance must be studied, then many related questionsincluding those raised here and by Kohl and Davis-must also be studied. Which journals do the larger population of non-ARL directors and ACRL members feel are important? What is the relationship between a respondent's own specialized area and the subject area of the journal being rated? What are the correlates of "prestige" or "importance"? Can prestige or importance be predicted from other variables? What is the basis for equating prestige and importance? Is prestige a variable of real utility, or does it merely make an author feel good? Do studies of prestige contribute to the knowledge base of our profession? Or does the knowledge base contribute to prestige? Prestige is not a guarantee of quality, say Kohl and Davis. Likewise quality is not a guarantee of pres- March 1987 tige. Then what is quality, and what is the relationship between prestige and quality? Kohl and Davis suggest citation analysis; other kinds of impact should also be examined. It seems that whenever we attempt to measure attitudinal variables, we can never really pin them down without reference to behavioral variables. Understanding of behavioral variables has much the greater potential for contributing to good theory.
In conclusion, whenever rating scores are used to produce rankings of items being rated, those rankings should be subjected to appropriate tests of statistical significance.
In fact, Professor McGrath's own analysis seems to confirm this general hierarchy or, as he calls it, clustering. It should be noted that he finds this very general clustering (into two groups) using the Scheffe test-the most conservative test of this kind possible. A less restrictive test such as the Duncan, Tukey, etc., would invariably have suggested finer distinctions among the journals. The issue, which McGrath's comments may obscure, is not whether there is or is not some hierarchy or ranked clustering but how fine the gradations of the hierarchy or clustering are.
We agree with McGrath's point that averages don't necessarily constitute a detailed ranking and hope that his comments may help prevent a misreading of Table 1 of our study by casual readers. We do feel, however, that his misinterpretation of Table 1 Swets ... an attractive, many facetted and transparent subscription service. We would be pleased to send youour informative brochure as well as detailed documentation of our services.
